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DUE PROCESS OR "SUMMARY" JUSTICE?: THE
ALIEN TERRORIST REMOVAL PROVISIONS
UNDER THE ANTITERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE
DEATH PENALTY ACT OF 1996
"You have adopted the right course, my dearest Secundus, in investigating
the charges against the Christians who were brought before you... Anony-
mous informations ought not to be received in any sort of prosecution. It is
introducing a very dangerous precedent, and it is quite foreign to the spirit of
our age."
-ROMAN EMPEROR TRAJAN, CIRCA 100 A.D.'
I. INTRODUCTION
The recent explosion and crash of Flight 800 to Paris2 only min-
utes after takeoff from John F. Kennedy International Airport in New
York prompted immediate speculation of terrorist involvement Such
fears-rampant before any conclusive evidence was gathered-seemed
reasonable in light of the scheduled opening ceremonies of the 1996
Olympics in Atlanta the day following the disaster.4 Regardless of what
1. Quoted in Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345, 368 (1956) (Black, J., dissenting).
2. July 17, 1996.
3. See Jonathan Freedland, Silence Whets Appetite for Conspiracy; TWA 800: Angry Rela-
tives Blame Politics for Delay, GuARDIAN, July 22, 1996, at 9; Bill Hutchinson, Logan Dogs to
Sniff Out Possible Sabotage, BOSTON HERALD, July 24, 1996, at 6; David Hanners, Conspiracy
Buffs Take to the Net; TWA Explosion is Fertile Ground, TIMES-PICAYUNE, July 28, 1996, at
A13.
4. With a security force of 30,000, preparations for the Atlanta Olympics were unprece-
dented. In spite of this security presence, the games were disrupted by a pipe-bomb in Centen-
nial park which killed two and injured 111 people. See Elizabeth Levitan Spaid, Blast Quiets
But Can't Silence Spirit Of Olympics, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, July 29, 1996, at 1; Wil-
liam Drozdiak, FBI Probes Bombing as Olympic Games Continue, WASH. POST, July 28, 1996,
at Al.
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the investigation ultimately reveals about the cause of the crash, this
event underscores the random, brutish and indiscriminate character of
terrorist attacks. Terrorism strikes across national boundaries from un-
expected sources, threatening all that civilized societies hold precious.
Flight 800 is only the latest reminder of the vulnerability of inno-
cents by terrorist activities. In 1988, Pan Am Flight 103 fell victim to a
terrorist bomb over Lockerbie, Scotland, killing all 259 people on board
and 11 on the ground.5 The World Trade Center bombing killed five
and injured hundreds more.6 The bombing in Dharan, Saudi Arabia,7
was a stark reminder of an earlier lesson8 that even peacekeeping sol-
diers whose mission is to protect others from violence are themselves
not immune to the swift and sudden fury of a terrorist's bomb. The
bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Building in Oklahoma City on April
9, 1995 represented the worst act of domestic terrorism in American
history. This ferocious deed, though apparently the result of a uniquely
homegrown variety of extremism, galvanized public support for tougher
methods of dealing with domestic and international terrorists.9 Shortly
after the bombing, the Comprehensive Terrorism Prevention Act of
1995 received renewed support in Congress." This act eventually be-
came the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA)," which was signed into law by President Clinton on April
24, 1996.
5. See Robin Wright, Bloodier Standard Set, Experts Fear; Pan Am Bombing May Esca-
late Terrorist Trend, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 31, 1988, pt. 1, at 1.
6. See John J. Goldman, Blast Rips World Trade Center in N.Y.; 5 Dead, Hundreds Hurt,
L.A. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1993, at Al.
7. This bombing, on June 25, 1996, took nineteen American lives and seriously injured
more than eighty. See Bradley Graham, Bomb Won't Deter U.S. in Gulf, Officials Say, WASH.
POST, June 27, 1996, at Al; See also Bodies of American Soldiers Flown Home, JERUSALEM
POST, June 28, 1996, at 6.
8. See Robin Wright, 1983 Beirut Blast Killed 241; U.S. Traces Bomber, Gear in Marine
Barracks Attack, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1988, pt. 1, at 1.
9. It is interesting to note that shortly before the bombing of the Murrah Building, studies
reassuringly reported that terrorism was on the decline. See, e.g., Robin Wright, U.S Claims
Success in Fighting Terrorism, RECORD, Feb. 12, 1995, at A30. After the bombing, the public's
rage blossomed into widespread support for staunch anti-terrorism measures. See, e.g., Neil A.
Lewis, Anti-Terrorism Bill: Blast Turns a Snail Into a Race Horse, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1995,
at A24; A.M. Rosenthal, Ending Forgiveness, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1995, at A31.
10. Less than two months after the bombing the Senate enacted S. 735, 104th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1995), otherwise known as the Comprehensive Terrorism Prevention Act of 1995. The
Act passed upon a vote of 91 yeas to 8 nays. See 141 CONG. REc. S7857 (daily ed. June 7,
1995) [Roilcall vote No. 242 Leg.]. See also Melissa A. O'Loughlin, Note, Terrorism: The
Problem and the Solution-The Comprehensive Terrorism Prevention Act of 1995, 22 J. LEGis.
103 (1996).
11. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat.
1214.
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The AEDPA is a particularly wide-ranging law, amending diverse
sections of the U.S. Code. 2 The law contains extensive immigration
reforms geared toward the removal of both illegal and legal aliens
whom the government has reason to believe are a threat to the security
of the United States. 3 The public sentiment necessary to pass laws
which potentially infringe on constitutional liberties is naturally easier
to garner after an incident like the Oklahoma City bombing, especially
where those targeted are historically unprotected by the passions of
election year politics. 4 However, the question is whether draconian
legislation is truly necessary in light of the dangers of these times, or
whether, as some would suggest, the Bill of Rights is merely another
casualty of terrorism."5
This comment will focus on one portion of the AEDPA's response
to international terrorism: Title IV, § 401 of the AEDPA, designated
"Alien Terrorist Removal," which adds a new title to the Immigration
and Nationality Act (INA)." These provisions set up a special court
charged with hearing the cases of suspected alien terrorists." Part II of
this comment will discuss specific contents of the provisions: the estab-
lishment of the new removal court and the procedures under which it
will operate, including the method by which secret evidence can be
12. Among the better known provisions of the AEDPA, and from which it draws its short
title, are those dealing with federal habeas corpus and death penalty reforms. The new provi-
sions culminate a decade of effort to streamline the federal appeals process for death row in-
mates. See id. §§ 101-08, 110 Stat. at 1217-26.
13. While outside the scope of this comment, it bears mentioning that the INS has been
given summary deportation powers over certain aliens whom it believes are in the United States
illegally. Thus, in terms of the treatment of illegals, judicial oversight has been completely
eliminated. See id. § 439, 110 Stat. at 1276. See also Charles Finnie, Both Police Officer and
Judge; The New INS Deportation Power, TEXAs LAWYER, May 20, 1996, at 21.
14. Says Oscar Chacon of Centro Presente, an immigrant's rights group, "[wie are in an
electoral year and it is a proven premise that if you are mean to immigrants in time of econom-
ic decline, you will gain popularity." Tatiana M. With, Immigrants Fear Federal Measures,
BOSTON GLOBE, May 12, 1996, (City Weekly), at 1. See also Mary Jacoby, The Platform;
Fight Looms Over Immigration Issue, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Aug. 12, 1996, at 15, reporting on
the Republican National Convention. The party ratified a platform position calling for reversal
of the constitutional guarantee of U.S. citizenship for all who are born on American soil.
15. See, e.g., Loren Fleckenstein, A Requiem for Arnold Heights, PRESS-ENTERPRISE, May
13, 1996, at BI; James Ridgeway, The Long Arm of the Law: Clinton's Anti-Terrorism Act
Beefs up Big Brother, VILLAGE VOICE, May 21, 1996, at 32; Benjamin Wittes, Secret Depor-
tation Panel Raises Due Process Issues; Critics Blast New Court Set Up by Anti-Terrorism
Law, RECORDER, Apr. 25, 1995, at 1.
16. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, sec. 401,
§§ 501-507, 110 Stat. 1214, 1258-68 (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1531-37). Within the text of
this comment, these amended sections of the INA will hereinafter be referred to as the "removal
court provisions."
17. See id. § 502, 110 Stat. at 1259.
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used against the alien. Part III will briefly trace the history of aliens'
rights under the Constitution for the purpose of illustrating the unique
status of immigration law in American jurisprudence. Under the so-
called "plenary power doctrine" the courts have traditionally deferred
almost entirely to the legislative and executive branches in the area of
immigration. While the doctrine has been displaced to some degree by
a traditional due process model, its historical importance could add an
unpredictable element to the Court's view of the new law.
Finally, in Part IV, the removal court provisions are analyzed under
the due process test articulated in Mathews v. Eldridge."5 This com-
ment takes the position that the alien's stake in removal court proceed-
ings involves a substantial liberty interest and that the proceedings are
properly viewed as quasi-criminal in nature. The suspected alien terror-
ist may too easily be denied his confrontation rights by the
government's use of secret evidence and then deported on a mere pre-
ponderance of the evidence. These features of the removal court provi-
sions, in conjunction with a lack of other significant procedural
protections, present an inordinate risk that the alien will be erroneously
deprived of his liberty.
II. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE REMOVAL COURT AND PROCEDURES FOR
THE REMOVAL OF SUSPECTED ALIEN TERRORISTS
The removal court provisions state that the Chief Justice of the
United States "shall publicly designate 5 district court judges from 5 of
the United States judicial circuits who shall constitute a court that shall
have jurisdiction to conduct all removal proceedings."'9 The removal
court is modeled after the seven-member secret court set up under the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA).2° Indeed, the
18. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
19. Sec. 401, § 502(a), 110 Stat. at 1259.
20. See 50 U.S.C. § 1803 (1994). The FISA is "intended to provide the exclusive means of
authorizing various types of electronic surveillance activities for national security purposes," in-
cluding:
(1) deliberate interception of international radio or wire communications to or
from a particular person in the United States;
(2) deliberate interception of wholly domestic radio communications, and the
installation or use of any monitoring device to acquire information about a
person's activities;
(3) interception in the United States of wire communications to or from any
person in the United States without the consent of the party to the communi-
cation.
See Americo R. Cinquegrana, The Walls (and Wires) Have Ears: The Background and First
Ten Years of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 793, 811
(1989).
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Chief Justice has discretion to designate these judges for concurrent
service on the removal court."
The procedures for the removal court are outlined in § 503 of the
new INA amendments. In any case in which the Attorney General of
the United States has reason to believe, based upon classified informa-
tion, that an alien is an alien terrorist,2' the Attorney General may seek
The government presents applications for warrants to the Foreign Intelligence Surveil-
lance Court (FISC) in "in camera, ex parte proceedings conducted under physical security mea-
sures designed to protect sensitive national security information." Id. at 812; see also 50 U.S.C
§§ 1804(a), 1805(a), and 1803(c). It is interesting to note that the FISC has never refused a
government counterespionage request. See Wittes, supra note 15.
21. See sec. 401, § 502(a), 110 Stat. at 1259. It seems likely that judges serving on the new
removal court will be culled from those with experience serving on the FISC, since it is that
group of judges who now form part of the judge pool for the new court. See Ridgeway, supra
note 15. But Nicholas Gess, director of the Justice Department's Office of Intergovernmental
Affairs, denies that the removal court is merely an extension of the FISC. While the judges and
the facility-a secure room on the sixth floor of the Justice Building--may be the same, Gess
maintains that the function of the two courts would be different. See Wittes, supra note 15.
22. The term "alien terrorist" means any alien described in § 241(a)(4)(B) of the INA:
(B) Terrorist activities
Any alien who has engaged, is engaged, or at any time after entry
engages in any terrorist activity (as defined in section 212(a)(3)(B)(iii) of this
title) is deportable.
Immigration and Nationality Act § 241(a)(4)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(4)(B) (West Supp. 1996).
The definition of "terrorist activity" and "engage in terrorist activity" are found in
§ 212(a)(3)(B)(ii & iii) of the INA:
(ii) Terrorist activity defined
As used in this Act, the term "terrorist activity" means any activity
which is unlawful under the laws of the place where it is committed (or
which, if committed in the United States, would be unlawful under the laws
of the United States or any State) and which involves any of the following:
(I) The highjacking or sabotage of any conveyance (including an air-
craft, vessel, or vehicle).
(li) The seizing or detaining, and threatening to kill, injure, or continue
to detain, another individual in order to compel a third person (including a
governmental organization) to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit
or implicit condition for the release of the individual seized or detained.
(III) A violent attack upon an internationally protected person (as de-
fined in section 11 16(b)(4) of title 18, United States Code) or upon the liberty
of such a person.
(IV) An assassination.
(V) The use of any-
(a) biological agent, or nuclear weapon or device, or
(b) explosive or firearm (other than for mere personal monetary gain),
with intent to endanger, directly or indirectly, the safety of one or more indi-
viduals or to cause substantial damage to property.
(VI) A threat, attempt, or conspiracy to do any of the foregoing.
(iii) Engage in terrorist activity defined
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removal of that individual by filing an application with the removal
court. The main requirement for this application is a statement of the
facts and circumstances relied on by the Department of Justice to estab-
lish probable cause that (1) the alien is an alien terrorist, (2) the alien is
physically present in the United States, and (3) with respect to such
alien, removal under title II23 would pose a risk to the national security
of the United States.24
An application for removal is submitted ex parte and in camera to
the removal court, and filed under seal.' A single judge on the remov-
al court may determine whether to grant the application. In making this
determination he may also consider, ex parte and in camera, "other
information, including classified information, presented under oath or
affirmation," and "testimony received in any hearing on the application,
of which a verbatim record shall be kept." '26 If the judge finds that the
application is well-taken, it shall be granted, and "the rights of the alien
regarding removal and expulsion shall be governed solely by this ti-
tle.,
27
As used in this chapter, the term "engage in terrorist activity" means to
commit, in an individual capacity or as a member of an organization, an act
of terrorist activity or an act which the actor knows, or reasonably should
know, affords material support to any individual, organization, or government
in conducting a terrorist activity at any time, including any of the following
acts:
(I) The preparation or planning of a terrorist activity.
(I) The gathering of information on potential targets for terrorist activi-
ty.
(III) The providing of any type of material support, including a safe
house, transportation, communications, funds, false identification, weapons,
explosives, or training, to any individual the actor knows or has reason to
believe has committed or plans to commit a terrorist activity.
(IV) The soliciting of funds or other things of value for terrorist activi-
ty or for any terrorist organization.
(V) The solicitation of any individual for membership in a terrorist
organization, terrorist government, or to engage in a terrorist activity.
Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a)(3)(B)(ii & iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(ii & iii)
(West Supp. 1996).
23. Title I, Chapter 5 of the INA provides for general deportation of certain classes of
aliens. See Immigration and Nationality Act §§ 241-50, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1251-60 (West Supp.
1996). For a version of the Immigration and Nationality Act current through January 1, 1993,
see BENDER'S IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT PAMPHLET (Publisher's Editorial Staff ed.,
1993).
24. See sec. 401, § 503(a)(l)(D), 110 Stat. at 1260. "National security" is defined as "the
national defense and foreign relations of the United States." Classified Information Procedures
Act, 18 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-16 (1994).
25. See sec. 401, § 503(a)(2), 110 Stat. at 1260.
26. Id. § 503(c)(1)(A & B), 110 Stat. at 1260.
27. Id. § 503(d), 110 Stat. at 1260.
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After an application is granted a removal hearing is expeditiously
conducted for the purpose of determining whether the alien is deport-
able on the grounds that he is an alien terrorist." This hearing is again
before a single judge on the removal court. The character of the pro-
ceeding is quasi-criminal: a suspected alien terrorist financially unable
to obtain counsel "shall be entitled to have counsel assigned" to repre-
sent him.29 Introduction of evidence and examination of witnesses,
however, are subject to the special rules of discovery laid out in
§ 504(e). These special rules and their accompanying treatment of clas-
sified information give rise to the most problematic aspects of the new
removal court and the procedures which govern it.
The government may introduce evidence obtained under the FISA.
This means the government may, under the auspices of national securi-
ty, use electronic, mechanical or other surveillance techniques to ac-
quire information which can then be used against the alien in the re-
moval proceedings." The new law also eliminates any notice require-
ment on the part of the government where it plans to introduce such
evidence, if the Attorney General determines that "public disclosure
would pose a risk to the national security . . . or otherwise threaten the
integrity of a pending investigation."'" Following the 1994 amend-
ments to the FISA. which expand its provisions to cover physical sur-
veillance as well, one civil libertarian has remarked that this "represents
a huge increase in the use of secrecy in American jurisprudence."32
Coupled with the explicit elimination of the exclusionary rule33 and the
inapplicability of the Federal Rules of Evidence,34 the procedures en-
sure that proceedings before the removal court will provide a stream-
lined method of expelling any individual whom the government be-
lieves is a threat to public security.35
28. See id. § 504(a)(1), 110 Stat. at 1260-61.
29. Id. § 504(c)(1), 110 Stat. at 1261.
30. See 50 U.S.C. § 1802(a)(1); see generally supra note 20. While the FISA does not
comprehend the recording of conversations of a foreign national who is not an agent of a for-
eign power, see United States v. Missick, 875 F.2d 1294, 1299-1300 (7th Cir. 1989), a suspect-
ed alien terrorist easily fits the definition of "agent of a foreign power." See 50 U.S.C.
§ 1801(b)(1)(A).
31. Sec. 401, § 504(e)(1)(C), 110 Stat. at 1262. Such a notice requirement is expressly pro-
vided for under the FISA, see 50 U.S.C. § 1806(c), but was eliminated in the removal court
provisions.
32. Wittes, supra note 15.
33. Sec. 401, § 504(e)(1)(B), 110 Stat. at 1262, states that "an alien subject to removal
under this title shall not be entitled to suppress evidence that the alien alleges was unlawfully
obtained."
34. See id. § 504(f), 110 Stat. at 1263.
35. The House Conference Report accompanying the new law makes clear that Congress
viewed suspected alien terrorists as a separate category not just from citizens but from the class
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In addition to the disposable notice requirement for evidence gath-
ered under existing FISA law, the AEDPA's removal court procedures
provide that much of this and other evidence may never be disclosed at
all to the suspected alien terrorist. Under the discovery rules of the
removal court provisions, the suspected alien terrorist is not entitled to
any information gathered under FISA36 or to any other classified infor-
mation for which the Attorney General determines that "public disclo-
sure would pose a risk to the national security of the United States or
to the security of any individual because it would disclose classified
information." '37 This evidence is instead examined by the judge ex
parte and in camera, presumably for the sole purpose of giving the
judge a full understanding of the nature of the evidence against the
alien.3" The government is then required to submit "an unclassified
summary of the specific evidence" which is deemed not to pose the
risks described.39
The judge has fifteen days in which to examine the unclassified
summary, and shall approve the summary if he finds that it is "suffi-
cient to enable the alien to prepare a defense." In these cases the
government is then required to deliver a copy of the classified summary
to the alien so the removal hearing can go forward. At the hearing "it is
the Government's burden to prove, by the preponderance of the evi-
of deportable aliens in general:
The removal of alien terrorists from the United States, and the prevention of
alien terrorists from entering the U.S. in the first place, present among the
most intractable problems of immigration enforcement... Yet, alien terror-
ists, while deportable under section 241(a)(4)(D) of the INA, are able to ex-
ploit many of the substantive and procedural provisions available to all de-
portable aliens in order to delay their removal...
H.R. CONT. REp. NO. 104-518, at 115 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 944, 948.
36. See sec. 401, § 504(e)(1)(A), 110 Stat. at 1262 provides that information derived pursu-
ant to FISA "shall not be authorized if disclosure would present a risk to the national security
of the United States." Curiously, this provision, unlike the others which relate to national secu-
rity, does not explicitly place the determination of risk in the hands of the Attorney General.
37. Id. § 504(e)(3)(A), 110 Stat. at 1262.
38. The judge has no authority to force disclosure by the government: "[nlothing in this
subsection is intended to allow an alien to have access to classified information." Id.
§ 504(d)(5), 110 Stat. at 1262.
39. Id. § 504(e)(3)(B), 110 Stat. at 1262.
40. Id. § 504(e)(3)(C), 110 Stat. at 1262. This standard for determining whether the sum-
mary of evidence satisfies the alien's due process rights was reduced in the final version of the
law. In the version which passed the Senate on June 7, 1995, the summary of evidence was re-
quired "to provide the alien with substantially the same ability to make his defense as would
disclosure of the classified information." S. 735, § 503(e)(6)(B), 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995),
reprinted in 141 CONG. REc. S7857, S7862 (daily ed. June 7, 1995). This lowered standard is
identified as one of the shortcomings of the removal court procedures. See discussion infra Part
IV.B.
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dence, that the alien is subject to removal because the alien is an alien
terrorist."" If, on the other hand, the judge deems the unclassified
summary insufficient, the government has an additional fifteen days to
correct the deficiencies identified by the court. If the revised summary
is still deficient, the "removal hearing shall be terminated."'42
III. ALIENS' RIGHTS AND THE PLENARY POWER DOCTRINE
To gauge the constitutionality of the uncompromising set of proce-
dures governing the new removal court, it is necessary to comprehend
the extensive power over immigration law that has traditionally been
placed in the political branches of government. More than a century
ago, the Supreme Court granted full power over immigration law to the
federal government,43 instituting what has come to be known as the
"plenary power doctrine." Though not explicitly granted by the Consti-
tution, the doctrine was the key feature of American immigration juris-
prudence for much of the twentieth century. While its contours have
changed over the years, the doctrine essentially declares that "Congress
and the executive branch have broad and often exclusive authority over
immigration decisions. Accordingly, courts should only rarely, if ever,
and in limited fashion, entertain constitutional challenges to decisions
about which aliens should be admitted or expelled.""
Since a distinct feature of the AEDPA is the broad authority placed
in the Secretary of State to "designate an organization as a foreign ter-
rorist organization,"'45 the extent to which the plenary power doctrine
is still operative in immigration law will help to determine whether it is
constitutional to place such power in a single appointed official. The
41. Sec. 401, § 504(g), 110 Stat. at 1263. Also diminished in the final version of the law is
the standard of proof required to establish that the alien is an alien terrorist. In the Senate ver-
sion of the bill the government was required to prove its case by "clear and convincing evi-
dence." S. 735, § 503(f), 141 CONG. REC. at S7862. This lowered standard is also identified as
a shortcoming of the removal court procedures, see discussion infra Part IV.B.
42. Sec. 401, § 504(e)(3)(D)(ii), 110 Stat. at 1262-63.
43. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889) confirmed congressional authori-
ty to prevent aliens from entering the country (the exclusion power) and Fong Yue Ting v.
United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893) similarly established congressional authority to send resident
aliens home (the deportation power). See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Federal Regulation of Aliens
and the Constitution, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 862, 862 (1989).
44. Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Con-
stitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L. J. 545, 547 (1990).
45. Sec. 302, § 219(a), 110 Stat. at 1248. This provision is not the focus of this comment.
However, it is nevertheless significant to an understanding of the reach of the new court. Any-
one belonging to an organization that has been designated a terrorist organization by the Secre-
tary can subsequently be haled before the removal court by the Attorney General based on their
membership alone. This raises serious First Amendment questions which will no doubt find
their way to the Supreme Court.
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continued vitality of the doctrine also affects the fundamental authority
of Congress to set up a separate court with a disparate and arguably
deficient set of procedural rules.
The history of judicial doctrine concerning aliens' rights in the
deportation context can be divided into three phases." Under the ple-
nary power doctrine, courts recognized that aliens in deportation hear-
ings were entitled to due process in some form, but they simultaneously
allowed Congress to dictate how much process was due.47 Legislators
during this phase were "practically unlimited in their ability to restrict
the rights of aliens."" During the McCarthy Era the fear of Commu-
nist infiltration of American society "reinvigorated"'49 the plenary pow-
er doctrine, facilitating one of the most shameful and paranoid episodes
in American history. Thus, the plenary power doctrine "emerged in the
oppressive shadow of a racist, nativist mood a hundred years ago...
[and] was reaffirmed during our fearful, cold war McCarthy days."50
Since under the plenary power doctrine the Court will "defer al-
most entirely to the legislature's plenary power over immigration rather
than intervene on behalf of the rights of aliens involved in immigration
proceedings,"51 its modem relevance has been questioned. In the early
cases which established the plenary power doctrine, the Court relied
overwhelmingly on international law principles respecting the sovereign
rights of nations.5" The Court "did not start with the text or structure
of the Constitution and ask how a power to regulate immigration might
be inferred. Rather, it approached the question of congressional power
from the perspective of the conduct of foreign affairs."" Thus, in
Fong Yue Ting, the Court quoted extensively from Vattel, Ortolan,
Phillimore and Bar before announcing that the right to deport foreigners
is an "inalienable right of every sovereign and independent nation,
essential to its safety, its independence and its welfare."5" This view of
46. See Jim Rosenfeld, Deportation Proceedings and Due Process of Law, 26 COLUM.
HuM. RTS. L. REv. 713, 733-39 (1995). Phase I, as Rosenfeld describes it, was marked by "a
relatively broad respect for alien's rights in deportation proceedings." This respect was mani-
fested in various ways, including the broad opposition to the Alien Act of 1798. Phase II repre-
sents the broad deference shown under the plenary power approach. Phase 111, the current ap-
proach, has moved toward a balancing of the respective interests of the parties.
47. See id. at 734.
48. Id.
49. See Motomura, supra note 44, at 555.
50. Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese
Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 HARv. L. REv. 853, 862 (1987).
51. Rosenfeld, supra note 46, at 733.
52. See Aleinikoff, supra note 43, at 863-65.
53. Id. at 863.
54. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 711 (1892).
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the "immigration power as an aspect of international relations suggested
a very limited-or nonexistent-role for the courts.""5
Of course, the foreign relations/international law model does not
logically entail the power of Congress to do as it pleases in any matter
touching on immigration. As Aleinikoff rightly suggests, "the Constitu-
tion may supply constraints on the foreign affairs power quite distinct
from those recognized under international law."56 Indeed, the steady
decline of the plenary power doctrine signals an end to the traditional
isolation of the entire body of immigration law from the constitutional
norms and principles developed through the process of judicial review
over the years." Yet, despite the "liberalization" of the doctrine in
recent years, the plenary power doctrine has not been completely eradi-
cated." While not likely to expressly dictate the constitutionality of
the removal court provisions, the doctrine may well provide a historical
backdrop which will color the analysis of the Court.5 In light of the
perceived threat of international terrorism, there is an inclination to
revert to the foreign relations/international law model which places few
limits on the legislative and executive branches to guard the nation's
security.' As in all areas of immigration and nationality law, the ple-
55. Aleinikoff, supra note 43, at 864. An example of this approach is found in
§ 241(a)(4)(C)(i) of the INA (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(4)(C)(i)), which provides for de-
portation of an alien if the Secretary of State has reasonable grounds to believe that his or her
presence or activities would have potentially serious adverse foreign policy consequences. This
provision "vests broad authority in the Secretary of State to interpret these undefined terms."
AMERICAN IMMIGRATION LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, 1993-94 IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY
LAW HANDBOOK 442 (1993). Aleinikoff suggests that had the immigration power been located
elsewhere-for example, in the Congress' power to regulate commerce with foreign na-
tions-the Court may have exercised stricter scrutiny of immigration laws through the years.
See Aleinikoff, supra note 43, at 864.
56. Aleinikoff, supra note 43, at 863. Even the nineteenth century international law com-
mentator Ortolan grudgingly admits this:
The government of each state has always the right to compel foreigners who
are found within its territory to go away, by having them taken to the frontier.
This right is based on the fact that, the foreigner not making part of the na-
tion, his individual reception into the territory is matter of pure permission, of
simple tolerance, and creates no obligation. The exercise of this right may be
subjected, doubtless, to certain forms by the domestic laws of each country;
but the right exists none the less, universally recognized and put in force.
Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 708.
57. See Motomura, supra note 44, at 547.
58. See Rosenfeld, supra note 46, at 737.
59. See, e.g., Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79-80 (1976) ("In the exercise of its broad
power over naturalization and immigration, Congress regularly makes rules that would be unac-
ceptable if applied to citizens").
60. Of course, it strains modern sensibilities to equate the power to protect the nation
against invading armies with the power to defend against "vast hordes of [a foreign] people
crowding in upon us," see Chae Chan Ping v. U.S., 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889). However, the
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nary power doctrine hangs over the constitutionality of the removal
court provisions "like a chilling, choking fog. 61
IV. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE REMOVAL COURT PROVISIONS
Due in part to the validating influence of the plenary power doc-
trine, Congress could be confident of the constitutionality of certain
aspects of the removal court provisions. For example, the Court long
ago determined that failure to abide by judicial rules of evidence does
not render a deportation hearing unfair.6" The exclusionary rule has
likewise been deemed inapplicable to deportation proceedings.63 In-
deed, the entire avenue of attack afforded by equal protection has been
blocked by the plenary power doctrine. Though the removal court pro-
visions single out aliens for disparate treatment under the law, the con-
cept of equal protection in regard to federal law based on citizenship
classifications is well settled.'
Nevertheless, if the new provisions were challenged, the consoli-
dated effect of the procedures governing the removal court would raise
serious constitutional concerns. The first chink in the armor of the
power to protect against international terrorism is related to national defense and arguably the
sole province of the political branches. Foreign relations with friendly nations are also at stake.
As stated in the House Conference Report on the AEDPA, "[t]he U.S. relies heavily upon close
and continued cooperation of friendly nations who provide information on the identity of such
terrorists. Such information will only be forthcoming if its sources continue to be protected."
H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-518 at 116 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 944, 948.
61. 1993-94 IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 55, at 417.
62. See Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149 (1923). Evidence during a deportation hearing is
now covered by INS administrative guidelines. See 8 CFR § 242.14(c) (1996), allowing any
oral or written statements into evidence as long as it is "material and relevant to any issue in
the case." While the removal court provisions specifically eliminate the applicability of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, they do not replace it with anything. Presumably the same standard
of materiality and relevance applies to proceedings before the removal court.
63. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984).
64. Aliens are persons under the Equal Protection Clause. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356 (1886). While the Equal Protection Clause does not apply to the federal government,
the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause guarantees equal protection in the application of
federal law. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). However, the Supreme Court has
traditionally afforded lenient treatment for federal laws which create classifications based upon
United States citizenship. Such laws are typically upheld under the rational basis test. All that
has been required in the past has been a showing by the federal government that the alienage
classification is not an "arbitrary and invidious imposition of burdens upon a politically power-
less group." The litany of cases adjudicated in this area demonstrate that the federal
government's interests in foreign affairs, foreign relations, and immigration and naturalization
will generally be deemed sufficient to justify a governmental classification based on alienage.
See, e.g., Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976); Alvarez v. INS, 539 F.2d 1220 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 918 (1976). The federal government's paramount interest in national security
and the physical security of its citizens would undoubtedly rise to the same level. See generally
JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14.12 (5th ed. 1995).
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plenary power doctrine was struck in Yamataya v. Fisher, in which the
Court recognized that aliens were generally entitled to due process of
law.65 In spite of the Court's eloquent promise, however, constitutional
protections have only been "nominally" applied to aliens in deportation
proceedings.' The "courts have, been willing to intervene solely on a
case-by-case basis and have issued no general protections of due pro-
cess rights in the deportation context." 7 The precise extent to which
the Due Process Clause applies in administrative and quasi-criminal ju-
dicial proceedings such as those before the removal court is therefore
unclear." While the modem approach to procedural due process under
Goldberg v. Kelly' and Mathews v. Eldridge" has expanded the
types of interests protected under the Due Process Clause, the issue of
whether a full package of rights applies to aliens in any particular set-
ting is complicated by the alien's transitional citizenship status. As the
Court has noted:
The alien, to whom the United States has been traditionally hospitable, has
been accorded a generous and ascending scale of rights as he increases his
identity with our society. Mere lawful presence in the country creates an
implied assurance of safe conduct and gives him certain rights; they become
more extensive and secure when he makes preliminary declaration of inten-
tion to become a citizen, and they expand to those of full citizenship upon
naturalization.71
In light of this sliding scale of rights, the current approach of the
law in the immigration context lies somewhere between the absolute
deference of the plenary power doctrine and the modem due process
balancing test established in Mathews.72 The removal court provisions
must therefore be analyzed under the Mathews model, with the caveat
that its balance could be skewed by the judicial deference traditionally
65. In Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 100 (1903), the Court stated:
But this Court has never held, nor must we now be now be understood as
holding, that administrative officers, when executing the provisions of a stat-
ute involving the liberty of persons, may disregard the fundamental principles
that inhere in "due process of law" as understood at the time of the adoption
of the Constitution.
66. See Rosenfeld, supra note 46, at 733.
67. Id.
68. See id. at 739; O'Loughlin, supra note 10, at 113.
69. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
70. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
71. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 770 (1950).
72. See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982), in which the INS sought to exclude a
permanent resident alien upon her return from Mexico. The Court applied the Mathews due pro-
cess test. However, it further remarked that "control over matters of immigration is a sovereign
prerogative, largely within the control of the Executive and the Legislature" and that "the role
of the judiciary ... does not extend to imposing procedures that merely displace congressional
choices of policy." Id. at 34-35.
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shown to federal immigration measures. The Mathews test was articu-
lated as follows:
[The] identification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires
consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be
affected by the official action; second, the risk of erroneous deprivation of
such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative bur-
dens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. 3
A. The Private Interest
Since the interests at stake in civil proceedings are typically
deemed less important than those in criminal settings, the private inter-
est prong under Mathews is often outweighed by other concerns. Pro-
ceedings before the removal court, and deportation hearings in general,
are categorized as civil in nature.74 In a mechanical sense, therefore,
the removal court provisions might easily be dubbed constitutional. If
the suspected alien's stake in removal proceedings is depicted as a mere
civil or administrative deprivation, it becomes easier to undervalue it.
However, the unique issues raised by the removal court provisions
deserve more than the facile reply that deportation is a civil matter. A
resident alien's deportation proceeding affects a substantial liberty
interest, and thus should provide more protection than is generally
afforded in civil settings. The Attorney General may take into custody
any alien who is the subject of an application for removal,75 and only
if the alien is a permanent resident is he entitled to a "release hearing"
at which bail can be set and the alien released if it appears to the re-
moval court judge that he is not a danger to national security and will
not flee.76 The quasi-criminal nature of the removal proceedings is also
implicitly recognized in the right of counsel granted to an alien in a
removal hearing. As already mentioned, an alien financially unable to
obtain counsel shall be entitled to have counsel assigned at government
expense, and for purposes of compensation "the matter shall be treated
as if a felony was charged."'77
73. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
74. See, e.g., Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 594 (1951) ("Deportation, however
severe its consequences, has been consistently classified as a civil rather than a criminal pro-
cedure").
75. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, sec.
401, § 506(a)(1)(A), 110 Stat. 1214, 1265.
76. See id. § 506(a)(2)(A), 110 Stat. at 1265.
77. Id. § 504(c)(1), 110 Stat. at 1261. This is not a right afforded to aliens in general de-
portation hearings. See Aleinikoff, supra note 43, at 414-22. However, in rare cases counsel has
been provided where necessary to assure "fundamental fairness," which is the "touchstone of
due process." Aguilera-Enriquez v. INS., 516 F.2d 565, 568 (6th Cir. 1975). Indeed, the right to
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In general, the quasi-criminal nature of deportation is also demon-
strated by the requirements placed on arresting officers after the de-
cision to proceed with deportation is made by the INS. While no
Miranda warning is required, officers are required to advise the alien of
(1) the reason for the arrest, (2) the alien's right to counsel at no cost to
the government, and (3) the alien's right to remain silent." These are
essentially the same requirements as defined by the Court in
Miranda.79
The recognition that deportation represents a loss of liberty led to
much of the uneasiness with the plenary power doctrine among past
members of the Court. As long ago as 1893, Justice Brewer observed:
But it needs no citation of authorities to support the proposition that deporta-
tion is punishment. Every one knows that to be forcibly taken away from
home and family and friends and business and property, and sent across the
ocean to a distant land, is punishment, and that oftentimes most severe and
cruel."0
Indeed, deportation may result "in loss of both property and life; or of
all that makes life worth living."'" Because of its drastic consequences,
deportation has been described by the Court as "draconian" punishment,
similar to "exile or banishment." 2
Yet the Court, in a relatively recent opinion, has again endorsed the
view of the majority in Fong Yue Ting that deportation is not punish-
ment. 3 "A deportation proceeding," writes Justice O'Connor,
is a purely civil action to determine eligibility to remain in this country, not
to punish an unlawful entry, though entering or remaining unlawfully in this
country is itself a crime. The deportation hearing looks prospectively to the
respondent's right to remain in this country in the future. Past conduct is
relevant only insofar as it may shed light on the respondent's right to re-
main.
84
counsel was perhaps granted in removal hearings to "compensate" for other reductions in rights.
See O'Loughlin, supra note 10, at 110 n.61.
78. See 8 CFR § 287.3 (1996).
79. See DAVID WEISSBRODTrr, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE IN A NUTSHELL § 7-3.1,
at 138 (2d ed. 1989).
80. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 740 (1893).
81. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922).
82. Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948). See also Wong Yang Sung v.
McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 50 (1950) ("A deportation hearing involves issues basic to human liberty
and happiness and, in the present upheavals in lands to which aliens may be returned, perhaps
to life itself').
83. See Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 709. The Court has periodically reiterated this idea that
deportation is non-punitive. See, e.g., Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 236 (1896);
Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 591 (1913); Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 39 (1923);
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 594 (1951).
84. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984) (citations ommitted).
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This view may be persuasive where, as in Lopez-Mendoza, the entirety
of the alien's offense is his illegal presence within the country. Howev-
er, for a legal resident alien whom the government suspects of terrorist
activity, a deportation proceeding is more than a non-punitive method
which merely determines future eligibility to remain in the country. It is
an investigation into alleged wrongful behavior. To apply Justice
O'Connor's view to resident aliens suspected of bad acts is to redefine
"punishment." One might as easily proclaim that a trial looks prospec-
tively at the accused's right to stay out of jail.
To ignore the liberty interest that aliens have in deportation hear-
ings is to rely to an unnatural degree on the dichotomy between civil
and criminal affairs. In short, the private interest involved in deporta-
tion occupies a middle ground between these types of law, and will
tend to be undervalued where the proceeding is perfunctorily classified
as civil in nature. Surely, deportation from this country "qualifies as a
great deprivation of liberty, and therefore would require extensive due
process protection."85
B. The Risk of Erroneous Deprivation
"Deprivation of liberty ... is the harshest action the state can take
against the individual through the administrative process."'se Deporta-
tion is a substantial deprivation of liberty, and the level of procedural
protection needed to guard against the erroneous deprivation of that
liberty has historically risen when such interests are implicated. This
concern brings to the fore the most notorious features of the removal
court provisions: the lowered standard for the summary of evidence
given to the suspected alien terrorist,87 and the lowered burden of
proof by which the government is bound to establish its case against the
alien.88
The standard for the unclassified summary of evidence can best be
understood through a comparison with earlier versions of the law, par-
ticularly the bill which passed the Senate on June 7, 1995.89 This ver-
sion provided that the unclassified summary used against the alien was
required "to inform the alien of the nature of the evidence that such
person is an alien [terrorist], and to provide the alien with substantially
the same ability to make his defense as would the classified informa-
85. Rosenfeld, supra note 46, at 744.
86. Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1296 (1975).
87. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, sec.
401, § 504(e)(3)(C), 110 Stat. 1214, 1262.
88. See id. § 504(g), 110 Stat. at 1263.
89. S. 735, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995), reprinted in 141 CONG. REC. S7857 (daily ed.
June 7, 1995).
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tion."'  This so-called "heightened standard summary"'" could be
lowered in the revised summary, but only after the court deemed that
particular criteria were satisfied.92
Whatever the due process problems inherent in these criteria for
accepting the "lower-standard summary,"93 Congress has mooted the
issue. Under the new law, the criteria for lowering the standard have
been dispensed with completely. The lower-standard summary is no
longer a substitute standard for exceptional cases; it has triumphed as
the sole standard which the unclassified summary must satisfy. In order
for the removal hearing to proceed under the new law, the summary of
evidence must only be "sufficient to enable the alien to prepare a de-
fense."94 Thus the level of secret and undiscoverable evidence which
can be used against the alien is greatly expanded, raising serious con-
stitutional concerns over the suspected alien's confrontation rights.
90. Id. at S7862 (emphasis added).
91. The term "heightened-standard summary" is used herein to describe the summary which
provides the alien with "substantially the same ability to make his defense as would disclosure
of the classified information." See O'Loughlin, supra note 10, at 108 n.50.
92. The Senate version provided that:
(E) If the revised unclassified summary is not approved by the court
within 15 days of its submission ... , the special removal hearing shall be
terminated unless the court, within that time, after reviewing the classified
information in camera and ex parte, issues written findings that-
(i) the alien's continued presence in the United States would likely
cause-
(I) serious and irreparable harm to the national security; or
(II) death or serious bodily injury to any person; and
(ii) provision of either the classified information or an unclassified
summary that meets the [heightened-standard] would likely cause-
(I) serious and irreparable harm to the national security; or
(II) death or serious bodily injury to any person; and
(iii) the unclassified summary prepared by the Justice Department is
adequate to allow the alien to prepare a defense.
S. 735 § 503(e)(6)(B), 141 CONG. REC. at S7862.
O'Loughlin, supra note 10, at 107-10, argues that these criteria provided no meaningful
check on the government's ability to dispense with the heightened standard summary. It is
worth noting that the precursor to the AEDPA, the Comprehensive Terrorism Prevention Act,
did not include any provisions for a required summary at all. The Specter-Simon-Kennedy
Amendment created the scheme described above, and was introduced for the explicit purpose of
restoring some semblance of an adversarial proceeding. See generally id.
93. The term "lower-standard summary" is used to describe the summary of evidence which
must only be "adequate to allow the alien to prepare a defense." See O'Loughlin, supra note
10, at 108 n.48.
94. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, sec. 401,
§ 504(e)(3)(c), 110 Stat. 1214, 1262. The significance of the change of wording in the lower-
standard summary, from "adequate" to "sufficient," is unclear. At any rate, they would seem to
establish an equivalent level of protection.
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. [Vol. 4:1
The lower-standard summary of evidence provides no meaningful
replacement for the important purposes which the Sixth Amendment
right of confrontation has traditionally served.95 Deportation hearings
are technically civil proceedings and thus carry no explicit Sixth
Amendment guarantee.9 6 However, the right of persons to be confront-
ed with the witnesses against them is an essential component of due
process. The quasi-criminal nature of deportation proceedings and the
substantial liberty interest at stake require that this right not be casually
disposed of, lest the risk of erroneous deprivation become too great.
Even if it is accepted that the singular purpose of confrontation is to
promote accuracy in the truth-seeking process,97 the frail guarantee
that the alien will be given a version of events prepared by his oppo-
nent which is merely "sufficient to prepare a defense" does little to
promote this process.98 In light of the lack of other procedural and
95. In Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895), the Supreme Court explained
the two-fold purpose underlying the confrontation clause. First, it affords the accused an oppor-
tunity to cross-examine the witness in order to test the witness' memory and possibly elicit in-
formation that might aid in his defense. Second, it gives the fact-finder an opportunity to ob-
serve the witness' demeanor and determine his credibility. See Joel R. Brown, Comment, The
Confrontation Clause and The Hearsay Rule: A Problematic Relationship In Need of A Practi-
cal Analysis, 14 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 949, 950 (1987). Another rationale of the confrontation
right, recognized centuries ago, is that people are less prone to lie in a public setting than they
are in situations where there is little or no accountability. See, e.g., SIR MATrHEW HALE, THE
HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND 163 (1713) ("That it is openly; and not in private
before a Commissioner or Two ... where oftentimes Witnesses will deliver that which they
will be ashamed to testify publicly."). See also Amy Gallicchio, Note, The Sixth Amendment
Right to Confrontation Where Reliability or Credibility of Witnesses is at Issue: The Extent and
Scope of Cross-Examination, 34 CATH. U. L. REV. 1267 (1985).
96. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the ight... to be confronted
with the witnesses against him... ". U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
97. The approach of the Court in recent years has diluted the historical function of the Con-
frontation Clause even in criminal settings. In Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 814 (1990), the
Court stated that the clause was a safeguard "generally designed to protect similar values" as
the hearsay rule. Such pronouncements have led to the charge that the Court has transformed a
Constitutional guarantee into an evidentiary doctrine, the only function of which "is the promo-
tion of accuracy in fact-finding... ". Margaret A. Berger, The Deconstitutionalization of the
Confrontation Clause: A Proposal for a Prosecutorial Restraint Model, 76 MINN. L. REV. 557,
558 (1992); see also White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 356-57 (1992) ("the Confrontation Clause
has as a basic purpose the promotion of the integrity of the factfinding process."). Some would
argue that even this function has been diluted. See, e.g., Jacqueline Miller Beckett, Note, The
True Value of the Confrontation Clause: A Study of Child Sex Abuse Trials, 82 GEo. L. J.
1605, 1607 (1994) (arguing that the Court's current approach has transformed the courtroom
"from a place where facts are processed and law is carefully analyzed to a place where unsub-
stantiated lies may be heard as truths... ").
98. In determining what evidence to provide to the accused alien terrorist, the government
will not likely be guided by the original purpose of the law-which is to protect classified
information-but will rather seek only to satisfy this low standard. Certain information, even if
not a risk to national security if furnished to the accused, will tend to be withheld if the stan-
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evidentiary protections provided in this law, due process demands the
restoration of a heightened standard for the unclassified summary. Oth-
erwise, those who stand before the removal court stand perilously close
to non-adversarial proceedings.
In spite of this semi-adversarial setting, the removal court provi-
sions also contain a reduced burden of proof by which the government
must establish its case against the suspected alien terrorist." The effect
of this lowered burden is predictable. In conjunction with the alien's
negligible confrontation rights and the lack of other meaningful proce-
dural protections, it renders the chance of an acquittal remote. In requir-
ing the case against the alien to be proved by a mere preponderance of
the evidence, Congress has all but stamped the accused's passport.
In its political rush to rid the country of accused alien terrorists,
however, Congress has brushed aside the Supreme Court's admonition
that deportation of aliens should be governed in all cases by a standard
of clear and convincing evidence. In Woodby v. INS"° the deportation
of a resident alien was ordered on the ground that she had engaged in
prostitution after her entry into the United States. Neither the hearing
officer nor the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) discussed what
burden of proof the government was required to bear in establishing
deportability; nor did they indicate the degree of certainty with which
they reached their factual conclusions. The Sixth Circuit nevertheless
upheld the deportation order without discussing the government's bur-
den of persuasion at the administrative level, finding only that BIA's
order was "supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence
on the record considered as a whole."' 0 ' The Supreme Court granted
certiorari to determine "what burden of proof the government is re-
quired to sustain in deportation proceedings."' 2
The Woodby Court remanded the case to the INS. It ruled that the
disputed provisions applied only to judicial review, and that the less
stringent statutory language of "reasonable, substantial, and probative"
evidence was not a satisfactory standard for the deportation proceeding
dard can otherwise be met.
99. Apparently, sufficiency of the evidence proved a difficult issue to resolve. The day be-
fore the Senate version of the bill passed, Senator Specter remarked on the floor that they were
still "wrestling" with whether the evidence to establish deportability should be clear and con-
vincing. See 141 Cong. Rec. S 7762 (daily ed. July 6, 1995) (statement of Sen. Specter). As al-
ready discussed, the bill passed the Senate with this intermediate burden intact, but was down-
graded in the House to the lower burden of a "preponderance." See supra note 41.
100. 385 U.S. 276 (1966).
101. Id. at 281. The language used by the court of appeals was based on the disputed provi-
sions in the INA which used the term "reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence" in con-
nection with deportation orders. Id.
102. Id. at 277.
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itself."3  Emphasizing the "drastic deprivation"'" that may follow
when a resident alien is expelled, the Court concluded:
In denaturalization cases the Court has required the Government to
establish its allegations by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evi-
dence .... No less a burden is appropriate in deportation proceedings ....
We hold that no deportation order may be entered unless it is found by
clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence that the facts alleged as grounds
for deportation are true." 5
Two months after Woodby was decided, Congress acted through
the INS to formally adopt the Court's view that deportation proceedings
merit an intermediate burden of proof."t° This regulation has been in
effect for nearly thirty years; not until the passage of the removal court
provisions has Congress promulgated a lower burden of proof within
the deportation context. This "get tough" policy choice, like the passage
of the antiterrorism bill itself, was undoubtedly a product of the Okla-
homa City bombing and the popularity of anti-immigrant election year
politics."07 Yet the competing constitutional policy embodied in the
Fifth Amendment has unfortunately been neglected.'0 8
Traditionally, Fifth Amendment liberty interests are implicated
where there is an element of punishment. Based on the severity of this
punishment, the burden of proof instructs the factfinder "concerning the
degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correct-
103. The Court's decision turned on the "elementary but crucial difference between burden
of proof and scope of review." Id. at 282. The burden of proof is imposed at the trial or origi-
nal proceeding, and is often higher than the scope of judicial review used on appeal. For exam-
ple, in a criminal trial the prosecution is required to establish the elements of the defense be-
yond a reasonable doubt. "But if the correct burden of proof was imposed at trial, judicial re-
view is generally limited to ascertaining whether the evidence relied upon by the trier of fact
was of sufficient quality and substantiality to support the rationality of the judgment." Id.
104. Id. at 285.
105. Id. at 285-86. Despite the Court's powerful language, its holding in Woodby did not es-
tablish an express constitutional mandate for a clear and convincing standard in deportation pro-
ceedings. The Court was interpreting specific statutory provisions of the INA. Once it conclud-
ed that Congress had "not addressed itself to the question of what degree of proof is required in
deportation proceedings," it was necessary to go no further than filling in the gap. See id. at
284.
106. Woodby was decided in December, 1966. In February, 1967 the INS amended the regu-
lation governing the burden of proof in deportation proceedings. See 32 Fed. Reg. 2883 (1967).
This amendment remains unchanged and is codified at 8 C.F.R. § 242.14(a) (1996):
§ 242.14 Evidence
(a) Sufficiency. A determination of deportability shall not be valid
unless it is found by clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence that the facts
alleged as grounds for deportation are true.
107. See With, supra note 14 and accompanying text.
108. U.S. CONST. amend. V. states that "[n]o person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law... "
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ness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication."" 9 At
one end of the spectrum lie criminal proceedings. Justice Brennan,
speaking for the majority in In Re Winship observed that "it has long
been assumed that proof of a criminal charge beyond a reasonable
doubt is constitutionally required..' 1  The requirement is "implicit in
'constitutions... [which] recognize the fundamental principles that are
deemed essential for the protection of life and liberty.""" Such pro-
tection is needed in the real world of accusations and trials because
there is always a margin of error, representing mistakes in factfinding,
which must be justly accounted for:
Where one party has at stake an interest of transcending value-as a criminal
defendant his liberty-this margin of error is reduced as to him by the pro-
cess of placing on the other party the burden of... persuading the factfinder
at the conclusion of the trial of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Due
process commands that no man shall lose his liberty unless the Government
has borne the burden of... convincing the factffmder of his guilt.'
11
Implicit in the Court's statements is the idea that the burden of
proof rises as the accused's liberty stake increases. This principle can-
not fairly be restricted by a rigid criminal/civil dichotomy, where one
type of proceeding is served the highest standard and the other is
thrown the judicial scraps. The intermediate standard of clear and con-
vincing evidence plays an important role in civil proceedings, and has
been used to give expression to a societal "preference for one of the
parties or a desire to handicap the other.""' 3 The Court has declared
such a heightened standard appropriate in libel suits," 4 in involuntary
commitment proceedings,"5 and state parental termination proceed-
ings." '6 As mentioned in Woodby, the Court has also consistently re-
quired clear and convincing evidence in expatriation" 7 as well as de-
naturalization cases."
8
Many of these types of proceedings, like those before the removal
court, are quasi-criminal in nature because they punish wrongful be-
havior. All pose a significant threat to individual liberty. When the in-
109. In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
110. Id. at 362.
111. Id. (quoting Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 488 (1895)).
112. Id. at 364 (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958)).
113. Lisa Pennekamp, Recent Case, 51 U. CIN. L. REV. 933, 935 (1982).
114. See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
115. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
116. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
117. See Gonzalez v. Landon, 350 U.S. 920 (1995); Nishikawa v. Dulles, Secretary of State,
356 U.S. 129 (1958). See also Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 285 (1966).
118. See Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118 (1943); Baumgartner v. United States,
322 U.S. 665 (1944); Nowak v. United States, 356 U.S. 660 (1958); Chaunt v. United States,
364 U.S. 350 (1960). See also Woodby, 385 U.S. at 285.
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terests at stake are "more substantial than mere loss of money,"'' 19 a
heightened burden of proof is required to minimize the risk of an erro-
neous judgment. The preponderance standard is constitutionally inade-
quate to satisfy due process in an alien's deportation proceeding before
the new removal court. If allowed to stand, it creates an inordinate risk
that the innocent and guilty alike will be punished.
C. The Government Interest.
As observed forty years ago, "we have been none too ingenious in
producing legal inventions for reconciling national security with proce-
dural fairness."'"0 Popular passions drown the faint echo of the caveat
that scrutiny of the law becomes quite limited in fact, especially in
times of crisis. National security is a unique concern, perhaps the most
imperative of federal government functions. Information relating to
national security must often be kept secret, however, and the public
view of this function often transmutes into a vital yet amorphous stake
against a faceless enemy. Guided only by a xenophobic national angst,
this preoccupation threatens the very nation it seeks to protect. As Jus-
tice Douglas commented, "[i]n days of great tension when feelings run
high, it is a temptation to take short-cuts by borrowing from the totali-
tarian techniques of our opponents. But when we do, we set in motion a
subversive influence of our own design that destroys us from with-
in.9 12
1
Government action against foreigners on our soil who pose a real
or perceived threat to national security is not new. In 1798 the United
States passed the Alien and Sedition Acts, both of which have since
been recognized as paradigms of government paranoia. 22  During
119. Addington, 441 U.S. at 424.
120. Kenneth Culp Davis, The Requirement of a Trial-Type Hearing, 70 HARV. L. REV. 193,
193 (1956).
121. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1950). Especially vul-
nerable are treasured First Amendment rights. Many observers believe the removal court is a re-
sponse to government frustration with the so-called "Los Angeles Eight." In 1987, seven Pales-
tinians and one Kenyan were arrested by the INS and charged with membership in the Popular
Front for the Liberation of Palestine, a Marxist wing of the Palestinian Liberation Organization.
The INS sought to deport them on charges of membership in an organization which supports
terrorism. The original charges were thrown out of court, and the government has attempted
other approaches over the years including subversion and visa violations. Some believe the
eight are being persecuted solely for their political affiliations. See Eve Pell, Secret INS Depor-
tation Plan: Kicking Out Palestinians, THE NATION, vol. 250, No. 5, at 167, February 5, 1990;
Alexander Cockburn, US-Hamas Links, NEW STATESMEN AND SOCIETY, vol. 6, No. 242, at 10,
March 5, 1993.
122. "The Alien Act empowered the President to order, without assigning cause, the sum-
mary arrest and deportation of any foreigner, even the citizen of a friendly nation, whom he
judged to be 'dangerous' to the peace and safety of the nation or believed 'suspect' of 'secret
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World War II, persons of Japanese descent were systematically rounded
up and imprisoned in internment camps against their will.'23 In the
1950's, aliens with communist sympathies were persecuted and often
deported. At the height of this second "red scare" the Supreme Court
held due process was not violated by federal statutes which made an
alien's present or former membership in the Communist Party, in and
of itself, a ground for exclusion or deportation.124 In light of these
past excesses, a "healthy skepticism" is called for whenever the gov-
ernment interest in protecting national security is invoked by legisla-
tors. I
But from a history of past abuse it does not logically follow that
the government is overstating the current threat posed by international
terrorism.'26 The United States has many enemies who are increasing-
ly well-financed, internationally established, and fanatically motivat-
ed.'27 To ensure that these enemies are continually monitored, the
nation must be allowed to protect secret information, especially that
which comes from international sources. This government interest in
secrecy should weigh heavily in the balance. But it should not be per-
mitted to squelch the civil liberties of those who have obeyed our im-
migration laws and who reside in this country legally. Where the gov-
machinations."' L. LEVY, JuIXiMENTS: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN CONSTrUTIONAL HISTORY 162
(1972).
123. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
124. See Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954) (dealing with § 22 of the Internal Security
Act of 1950); Hyun v. Landon, 350 U.S. 990 (1955) (dealing with § 241(a)(6) of the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act of 1952). Under these cases it was not necessary to show that the
deportee supported, or even had demonstrative knowledge of, the Communist Party's advocacy
of violence. For a fuller account of the case law from this era, see Annotation, Exclusion or
Deportation of Alien as Subversive-Federal Cases, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1617 (1958).
125. See Rosenfeld, supra note 46, at 747. See also 1993-94 IMMIGRATION AND NATIONAL-
ITY LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 55, at 442, remarking that the detailed definitions of terrorism
and the elimination of Communists, anarchists and other subversives under modern deportation
law reflect a political climate in which "'[tierrorists' have replaced Communists as the new
undesirables."
126. Since 1968 over 8500 terrorist acts worldwide have been claimed by over 700 different
terrorist groups. More than half of these have been directed at the United States or its citizens.
See STEPHAN BOWMAN, WHEN THE EAGLE ScREAMs: AMERICA'S VULNERABILITY TO TERROR-
ISM 11 (1994).
127. See id. at 12-34, listing many of the well-known and active international terrorist
groups. Predictably, many of these groups originate in the volatile Middle East. See Kevin
Fedarko, Who Wishes Us Ill?, TIME, July 29, 1996, at 41.
The reality of a more advanced breed of terrorist was not lost on Congress. The House
Conference Report states that "[tierrorist organizations have developed sophisticated interna-
tional networks that allow their members great freedom of movement and opportunity to strike,
including within the United States. They are attracting a more qualified cadre of adherents with
increasing technical skills." H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-518, at 116 (1996), reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 944, 948.
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emnment interest in secrecy is overstated it nullifies other legitimate
concerns, and vague accusations from untraceable sources become
sufficient to arrest, try, convict and banish.
V. CONCLUSION: THE PROPER BALANCE
International terrorism is an evil which has only begun to haunt the
West. Effective methods must be developed to prevent attacks and to
guard against the unsettling presence of those who would kill and maim
innocents to further their extremist agendas. However, when we allow
fear and outrage to guide our response the terrorist wins. Laws to com-
bat terrorism must be forceful and effective, but balanced against the
civil liberties of all residents, not just citizens of the United States.
The removal court provisions of the AEDPA have struck the wrong
balance. This portion of the new antiterrorism law likely passed because
it targets aliens, a group whose rights have traditionally been dictated
by the political branches of the government rather than the courts.
However, due process for legal resident aliens should not be relegated
to an empty promise. If the provisions are challenged, the courts must
intervene under a modem approach which properly balances an alien's
substantial liberty interests against other concerns. The government's
countervailing interests are undeniably strong. In light of the increasing
fanaticism of many terrorist groups and the growing sophistication of
their methods, prevention of terrorist acts and protection of the classi-
fied information utilized to track suspected terrorists is an urgent and
necessary function of the federal government.
However, the dearth of significant procedural and evidentiary safe-
guards in the removal court provisions creates an undue risk that legal
resident aliens who have obeyed the immigration laws and are guilty of
nothing more than unpalatable political affiliations will suffer erroneous
deprivation of their liberty to remain in this country. Congress should
remedy the imbalance of the new law by amending it in the following
two ways. First, the heightened standard for the unclassified summary
of evidence should be restored. While classified information must re-
main secret, the only meaningful substitute for the suspected alien's
confrontation rights is a standard which provides substantially the same
ability to prepare a defense as he would have if all information were
presented. Second, the government should be required to prove its case
against the suspected alien terrorist by clear and convincing evidence.
Passed in the wake of the horrific tragedy of the Oklahoma City
bombing, the removal court provisions reflect the understandable desire
of an outraged public for strict and uncompromising measures to pre-
vent acts of terrorism. But even though the removal court was inspired
by the government's most frustrating attempts to deport supposed for-
eign terrorists, there is no guarantee that its application will be restrict-
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ed to egregious cases. Nicholas Gess, director of the Justice
Department's Office of Intergovernmental Affairs, has remarked that
"this law allows us to do what we could not do before."'' 2' This obser-
vation, made by an unabashed proponent of the new law, may be the
most accurate and telling assessment of all.
Lawrence E. Harkenrider
128. Wittes, supra note 15.
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